

2014

Secure Android Code Helper (Sach): A Tool For Assisting Secure Android Application Development

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Secure Android Code Helper (SACH): A Tool for Assisting Secure Android Application
Development

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North Carolina A&T State University

A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

Department: Computer Science

Major: Computer Science

Major Professor: Dr. Xiaohong Yuan

Greensboro, North Carolina

2014

The Graduate School
North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University

This is to certify that the Master's Thesis of

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2014

Biographical Sketch

Edward Hill has lived most of his life in Rockdale County, a very small town Southeast of Atlanta, Georgia. He obtained his Bachelor of Science Computer Science degree from North Carolina A & T State University, Greensboro, United States. While pursuing his education he also played four years of football for the university as a scholar athlete.

In August 2013, he enrolled at the North Carolina A & T State University, Greensboro, United States, to pursue his Master of Science Computer Science degree. Mobile security, network security and cloud computing are some of his research interests.

Dedication

This work is dedicated to my parents Janice Morris, Tolbert Morris, Edward Hill Sr. and Betty Hill.

Acknowledgements

First acknowledgement goes to God.

I am grateful for the prayers and encouragement from my parents. I would like to acknowledge every effort you all have made to provide me with tools I needed to succeed.

Further, I would like to acknowledge Dr. Gerry Dozier, Dr. Mohd Anwar, Prof. Edmundson Effort and Cody Cannon for the inspiration and encouragement to pursue my Master's in Computer Science.

In addition, I am very appreciative towards my advisor Dr. Xiaohong Yuan for her guidance, advice, financial support and constructive criticism throughout my completion of graduate school.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my committee members; Dr. Kelvin Bryant and Dr. Huiming Yu whose efforts have help me bring this thesis to a completion.

My appreciation also goes to the other professor who shared their wealth of knowledge with me and gave me wise advice.

Lastly, I would like acknowledge Sabrina Edmonds, Nate Isles, Adrian Burke and again Cody Cannon for being a great friends and keeping me uplifted throughout my wonderful college experience.

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Abstract

Mobile devices now store a lot of sensitive data. With many users adapting to the technical advancement of mobile devices, security of the user's sensitive data becomes imperative. Security vulnerabilities in the mobile apps will lead to leakage of user's sensitive data. The goal of this research is to propose a tool to help programmers create secure Android applications. The tool will warn developers about specific classes or methods that include security vulnerabilities such as data leakage and access control vulnerabilities. The tool analyzes Android source code using two approaches: 1) Parse the source code and XML to report vulnerabilities based on CERT secure coding rules for Android application development and 2) Run FlowDroid on source code, parse the output of FlowDroid and look for device ID, GPS location data being leaked to a log file or through implicit intent. The results from these approaches are combined into reports that inform developers of security vulnerabilities. The proof of concept of the tool has been implemented and tested. Future work includes completing implementation of the tool and running tests on a large number of source codes to evaluate its effectiveness.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Open operating systems are no longer common to desktops and mainframes but are now working their way to mobile devices. This new generation of mobile devices aids in connection with already existing on-line services (Enck, 2009). Mobile devices have become warehouses, storing a lot of sensitive data. While PC shipments have been significantly declining according to a report by the International Data Center (IDC, 2013 b), mobile device shipments have been significantly increasing. This could imply users are transitioning to the new generation of mobile devices. With many users adapting to the new technical advancement of mobile devices, security of the user's sensitive data is imperative.

The top software platform contenders are Blackberry, IOS, Windows Phone and Android. Android accounts for 81.0% of smart phones (IDC, 2013 a). The Android operating system is designed with security in mind, and uses Linux as its kernel to isolate an application from other applications within the environment by using permissions (Clark, 2010). Although Android has a solid foundation to protect the applications from other application within the environment, bad design practices in the application themselves can lead to sensitive data being leaked. There is a need to develop tools that can statically analyze developers' applications before they are publicly available.

Existing tools have been developed to analyze android applications. COPES (Bartel, 2012) is a static analysis tool to address the issue of applications being given more permission than they need to functionally perform. A related tool named Brox (Siyuan, 2013) uses static taint analysis to detect if applications are leaking GPS information. LeakMiner (ZheMin, 2012) is another

static taint analysis tool used to detect if an application leaks sensitive information. FlowDroid also analyze applications statically using taint analysis to detect sensitive data leakage (Artz, 2012).

This research proposes SACH (Secure Android Coding Helper), a tool that combines statically analyzing developers' code with static taint analysis to detect flow that can result into unexpected data leakage. A combined report with both methods will give developers a better understanding if their application is vulnerable to data leakage or susceptible to manipulation from other applications. Unlike the previously mentioned tools, SACH analyzes vulnerabilities by directly parsing the developer's source code. Also SACH detects if the DevecidID or GPS information is sent using a broadcast intent utilizing Android's inter process communication. The algorithms designed for SACH are described. A prototype is implemented and tested on 73 programs.

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a literature review of vulnerabilities in the Android applications, cause of data leakage, access control, secure coding practices and static analysis. Chapter 3 describes the overall design of SACH and the algorithms used to detect vulnerabilities related to data leakage and access control. Chapter 4 describes the prototype implementation of SACH. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and discusses future work.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

This chapter provides literature review in the areas of vulnerabilities in the android environment, data leakages, access control mechanisms in Android, secure coding practices and static analysis.

2.1 Top Ten Vulnerabilities

OWASP describes the top ten vulnerabilities in mobile applications (OWASP, 2013). These vulnerabilities are briefly described below:

- **Weak Server Side Controls** - Weak server side controls refers to mobile applications having access to APIs provided by organizations such as Send Grid. The APIs can be abused by the user, malware or a vulnerable application on the device.
- **Insecure Data Storage** - Insecure data being stored in SQLite databases, logs, xml or manifest files, SD cards and cookies. Best practices are often to encrypt sensitive information with AES 128, do not set the mode of shared preferences to world readable unless needed, avoid hard coded encryption and decryption keys, use the “setEncryption” API to encrypt local data and add an addition level of encryption.
- **Insufficient Transport Layer Protection**- Data on mobile devices are also susceptible to insufficient transport layer protection due to threat agents such as malware, monitored network and malware. The threat agents can take advantage in weak SSL implementation.
- **Unintended Data Leakage** - Sensitive data can be leaked via malware, modified versions of legitimate applications or if an unauthorized user has access to the device. Sensitive data can be breached by using free forensic tools or by using API to access the vulnerable data.
- **Poor Authorization and Authentication** - Authorization and authentication controls can be bypassed by submitting automated input to the server. Server side authentication and authorization must be enforced to prevent this type of attack. If the application requires offline access, mechanisms should be put in place so the client mobile application can check the integrity within the code for medications.

- **Broken Cryptography** - Encrypting data without proper protocols can result in broken cryptography. Threat agents to encrypted data include a user gaining access to the device or mobile malware representing the user. Vulnerable encryption is due to poor key management, using custom algorithms and the use of insecure or deprecated algorithms.
- **Client Side Injection** - Applications are also vulnerable to client side attacks such as SQL injection, JavaScript injection, local file inclusion and intent injection; This can happen when untrusted data is sent via internal user, external users, the applications itself or malware on the device.
- **Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs** - It refers to how applications can be vulnerable to untrusted inputs via Inter Process Communication (IPC). Applications should restrict incoming IPC communications and not send sensitive data using IPC.
- **Improper Session Handling** - The outcome of poor authentication can result in improper session handling. This typically involves using insecure tokens, cookies that have not been reset after authentication state changes and lack of timeout protection.
- **Lack of Binary Protection** - Lack of protection from reverse engineering is also an issue. Applications need the ability to detect if it has been modified; Or if it is robust enough against static analysis.

2.2 Causes of Data Leakage

Data leakage happens when data are vulnerable to access outside the scope of an application resulting in the breach of mobile users' confidentiality. Methods of data leakage include URL caching, keyboard press caching, copy/paste buffer caching, application back grounding, logging, HTML5 data storage, browser cookie objects, and analytic data sent to 3rd parties (OWASP, 2013).

- **URL Caching** - The responses and requests used by an application to access a network can be stored to increase processing speed.
- **Keyboard Press Caching** - A user keyboard presses can be stored in memory for future use.
- **Copy/Paste Buffer Caching**- When data is copied, it is stored into a buffer that can be stored in the buffer can be used later to paste the data.

- Application Backgrounding- Components of an Android application can execute code that runs in the background with an interface. For example data can be exchanged between applications by using IPC to send intents. The intents can be manipulated to breach the privacy of data.
- Logging- Data can be stored by writing information to a log file. The log file can be read by other applications with the proper permission prior to Android version 4.0. The log file can also be read if the device is connected to a computer.
- HTML5 Data Storage- Web pages can store data locally within an application for future use. HTML5 web storages are similar to cookies but designed with better security and performance and can store more data.
- Browser Cookie Objects- Cookies are small data that are stored in text files for servers to remember information about the user.
- Analytic data- Data can also be leaked by applications that collect information about the user to sell or give the information to third parties.

2.3 Access Control Mechanism in Android

Unlike traditional systems where applications inherit permissions from the account used to run the application, each application in the android operating system runs as its own user account. This feature of the Android operating system allows applications to isolate their data from other applications but they can still access other applications data if their requested permission is granted. Android also uses an install-time permission model, where the user must review a list of permissions an application is requesting. The permissions an application requests during installation must be granted by the user in order to continue installation. This feature allows the user to be notified of what an application could do if granted particular permissions allowing users to make informed decisions. Another benefit that the permission model provides is to limit what a legitimate application could access if it was compromised.

Permissions are defined in the extensible markup language (xml) file of the application.

Permissions has the following attributes (Six, 2012):

- Label - The label provides a very short summary of the permission while the description attribute provides more detail.
- Icon – Is the icon used to represent the permission.
- Name – The name attribute is used to refer to the permission for example “com.example.project.General_Action”.
- Description – The description attribute provides an in depth description of the permission that will be prompted to the user.
- Protection Level – The protection level attribute allows the permission to be defined as normal, dangerous, signature or “signatureorSystem”. The normal permission informs the user that the permission does not pose as a threat to the user. The dangerous permission informs the user that the permission can pose as a threat to the user’s sensitive data. A requesting application with the same digital certificate as the application that declared the permission can be granted permissions if the declared permission is a signature permission. The “signatureorSystem” permission is similar to the signature permission except it grants permission to the Android system image.
- Permission Group - Allows the Android package installer to prompt the user of requested permissions when they are presented to the user upon install

2.4 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Rules for Android

Researchers from Carnegie Mellon University published some rules that can be applied to android specific applications to promote secure coding (Seacord, 2014). Twenty three topics are covered but not all of them are complete. This section will cover the topics that are complete and can be used to implement the algorithms for SACH.

- (DRD01-J) Limit the accessibility of an app's sensitive content provider. Application can share data with other applications using content providers. To prevent unauthorized access to sensitive data, the export attribute in the AndroidManifest.xml should be set to “false”, making the content provider private. Before API level 16, the content provider is set to public by default unless the export value specified “false”.
- (DRD02-J) Do not allow WebView to access sensitive local resource through file scheme. Malware can also manipulate web view to open malicious code (ex. maliciously crafted HTML) that is stored on the device. This can be done through setJavaScriptEnabled setPluginState and setAllowFileAccess methods within web views.

- (DRD03-J) Do not broadcast sensitive information using an implicit intent Another high security risk is when developers send sensitive data implicitly throughout the system. When data is sent implicitly, any application including malware can read the data.
- (DRD04-J) Do not log sensitive information Applications that log sensitive information leave the data vulnerable to be read. Other applications may have access to the logs (before Android 4.0) or the logs can be read if plugged into a pc. It is better not to write sensitive information to logs or to implement a custom log class so output is not automatically displayed.
- (DRD09-J) Restrict access to sensitive activities - Restriction to the application needs to be considered when developing applications. Other applications can activate an activity for unintended use if the developer's application is accessible due to the exports value being set to true.
- (DRD10-J) Do not release apps that are debuggable - Android applications can also be vulnerable to be debugged, even without the source code. The debuggable attribute need to be set to false to avoid the application being understood by users.

2.5 Static Analysis

Some research has been conducted on applying static analysis methods on mobile application source code. Using static analysis, different methods of taint analysis has been researched to trace identified variables within the Android OS to function calls. This section will provide a review of related literature.

The developers of Brox (Siyuan, 2013) analyzed android application using taint analysis to detect if an application requested location, device or contact information from the device to be sent via network or SMS. Location information is managed by the LocationManager in the android architecture for an application to acquire the device GPS location. The device information is referring to the unique identifier such as International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI) and International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) which are managed by the TelephonyManager and can be used to uniquely identify a device. The TelephonyManager also

controls contact information such as addresses and phone numbers. Information can leave the device by using the smsManager or the internet by using the socket class.

Similar to Brox, developers of LeakMiner (ZheMin, 2012) analyzed applications using static taint analysis to determine same flows (a flow is the call path from a data stored in the device to sink where that data is sent) as Brox but looked for information from the calendar or sms. The developers identified any flows between the sensitive information they declared to the log files. After android version 4.1, applications cannot read log files even with the READ_LOG permission. Log files can still be read if the device is connected to a computer (Seacord, 2014). LeakMiner analyzed 1750 applications and found 145 true leakages. Based on their results, device ID was the sensitive information leaked the most.

EC Spride developed a static analysis tool named FlowDroid (Artz, 2014). FlowDroid constructs the Android's lifecycle to be able to handle callbacks invoked within the Android framework. To minimize false positives that many static analysis tools produce the author introduced context, flow, field and object sensitivity into FlowDroid. There is also a suite of mobile applications named DroidBench. DroidBench is designed to test the accuracy and effectiveness of other static analysis tools built to analyze Android applications. FlowDroid statically outperformed commercial tools such as Fortify and IBM Security AppScan Source statistically. FlowDroid scored a 93% recall and an 83% precision score.

In related research, researchers developed dynamic taint analysis tools. TaintDroid is an extension of the Android framework that monitors data flows produced by third party applications (Enck, 2014). TaintDroid assumes that third party applications are not trusted. Based on this assumption, TaintDroid attempts to detect when sensitive data is leaving the

system with the assistance of third party applications. TaintDroid provides real time feedback so that the user can decipher whether or not an application is doing something malicious. The authors evaluated the accuracy of TaintDroid by randomly selecting 30 popular applications that use the phone's location, camera and microphone data. TaintDroid identified 105 instances where tainted data (sources) left the system; 37 were determined to be legitimate instances of leaked data.

CHAPTER 3

SACH - A Tool for Assisting Secure Android Application Development

This chapter provides will discuss the overview implementation of SACH and algorithms designed for SACH.

3.1 An Overview of SACH

SACH uses two approaches to detect vulnerabilities in Android applications. One component of SACH parses Android source code according to CERT (Seacord, 2014). The second component of SACH uses FlowDroid (Artz, 2014) to analyze data leakage by using static taint analysis. The results of both components are combined into one report. FlowDroid provides the functionality to analyze the developers' code statically and detect if data are vulnerable to data leakage. Unlike the first component of SACH, FlowDroid added the ability to map vulnerabilities even if the vulnerability is in a different class where the data is being leaked.




Figure 1. This figure is an overview of SACH.

3.2 Algorithm Design for SACH

Six algorithms were designed for SACH. The algorithms parse java and the android manifest file to find vulnerabilities. The algorithms are based on the vulnerabilities mentioned by CERT

(Seacord, 2014). The following algorithms of SACH, FlowDroid describes the results are also utilized in the implementation of these rules.

3.2.1 Limit the accessibility of an application's sensitive content provider

This algorithm is based on the rule DRD01-J in CERT rules. A content provider is a component of an application that can manage and share data with other applications on the device. To prevent unauthorized access to content providers, a developer can restrict access by specifying the export attribute to false. Before Android API 8, the content provider is accessible even if the export attribute be set false. Also before API 16, the export value must be set to false so that the content provider is not accessible by other applications. The following algorithm (*Figure 2*) searches whether the program export value is set to true and it is before API 16. If this vulnerability is detected, a warning message will be generated and logged.

input:

project.properties

Androidmanifest.xml

algorithm:

variable api

variable automatic_private_api=17

variable regardless_available_api=8;

parse project.properties for api version

store api version in variable api

variable exported_value

array content_provider_info

variable content_provider_name

variable public_contentprovider= ""android:exported="true""

variable private_contentprovider= "android:exported="false" "

parse file for "<provider" to ">"

store text into array content_provider_info

parse each array in content_provider_info for "android:exported="false"" and "android:name =x

if export_value == public_contentprovider

write to text file, "WARNING: Found content provider: "+content_provider_name+ "set as public. If a content provider is to be made public, the data stored in a provider may be accessed from other applications. Therefore, it should be designed to handle only non-sensitive information."

else if export_value == private_contentprovider && api > regardless_available_api

do nothing

else if export_value==null && api >= variable automatic_private_api

```

do nothing

else

write to text file, "WARNING: Content provider"+ content_provider_name+ " is not set as
private. If a content provider is to be made public, the data stored in a provider may be accessed
from other applications. Therefore, it should be designed to handle only non-sensitive
information."

```

Figure 2. This is an algorithm for limiting the accessibility of content provider.

3.2.2 Do not broadcast sensitive data

This algorithm is based on rule DRD03-J in CERT rules. Applications can share data implicitly that is sent throughout the whole system. Implicit intents are used when actions are not specified to a specific android component. Since any application with the proper receiver is able to access the data, it is important to search the application for implicit intents. This algorithm uses FlowDroid to detect if the DeviceId or GPS data is being sent using a broadcast intent. A warning will be generated if the implicit intent is not bounded to only the application itself.

Input:

FlowDroid output file

Algorithm:

Variable add_to_queue

store line in a string

create a queue linked list

read in each line

Evaluate if the line is a detection of a flow and if it is a send broadcast sink

if the line is a detection of a flow not pertaining to send broadcast, set the variable to

add_to_queue to false

determine if the line is a detection of a send broadcast flow

if the line is a send broadcast flow, set the variable to add to the queue to true

Evaluate if the line contains DeviceID as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true

extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variables

add warning message "The deviceID is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?"

within the method "?"

Evaluate if the line contains getLatitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true

Extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variable

add warning message "The GPS latitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?"

within the method "?"

Evaluate if the line contains getLongitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to

true

extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variable

add warning message "The GPS longitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class
"?" within the method "?"

The final line contains "Analysis" at the beginning. If the line contains "Analysis" at the
beginning, the you have reached the last line

If the queue is empty, then print out that nothing was found

write to text file

set add to queue variable to false

else

if the queue is not empty

write each node in the queue to the report text file

set add to queue variable to false

output "Using sendBroadcast() ,any application on the system can receive the broadcast,
including malicious applications.

Solutions:

Receivers of the broadcast should be restricted. Starting with Android version Icecream
Sandwich you can restrict the broadcast to a single application using Intent.setPackage. It is
possible to also restrict a broadcast to only broadcast within the application using
LocalBroadcastManager."

Figure 3. This is an algorithm to detect if there is data leakage via broadcast intent.

3.2.3 Do not allow webview to access sensitive local resource through file scheme

This algorithm is based on rule DRD02-J in CERT rules. The webview class allows web pages to be displayed within an activity. The webview is vulnerable to be manipulated to access local resources on the file system by a third party requesting the webview to handle an action. This algorithm looks at three state attributes which are the plugin, allow file access and Java script state. A warning message will be generated if the plugin, allow file access or Java script state is set to true.

input:

project.properties

variable api

parse project.properties for api version

store api version in variable api

variable line_number = 0

array line_numbers

variable Java_Script_State

variable Plugin_State

```
variable Allow_File_Access_State

parse each line for setJavaScriptEnabled( x )

increment line_number +1

if x exist

    store x in Java_Script_State

    if Java_Script_State == "true"

        store line_number into line_numbers[x]

    else if Java_Script_State == "false"

        do nothing

    else

        store line_number into line_numbers[x]

if line_numbers is empty

    do nothing

else

    Print "Warning: Java Script is not set to false on line(s) "
```

Print line_numbers

Print “When the target activity (webView object) sets JavaScript enabled, it can be abused to

access the target application’s resources”

parse each line for Plugin_State(x)

increment line_number +1

if * exist

store * in Plugin_State

if Plugin_State == “ON”

store line_number into line_numbers[x]

else if Plugin_State == “OFF”

do nothing

else if Plugin_State == “ON_DEMAND”

store line_number into line_numbers[x]

else

store line_number into line_numbers[x]

if line_numbers is empty

```
do nothing

else

Print “WARNING: Pugin state is not set to OFF on line(s) ”

Print line_numbers

Print “The setPluginState() method tells the WebView to enable or disable the plugin”

parse each line for Allow_File_Access_State( x )

increment line_number +1

if * exist

store * in Allow_File_Access_State

if Allow_File_Access_State == “TRUE”

store line_number into line_numbers[x]

else if Allow_File_Access_State == “FALSE”

do nothing

else

store line_number into line_numbers[x]
```

```
if line_numbers is empty

do nothing

else

Print "WARNING: Allow File Access State is not set to FALSE on line(s) "

Print line_numbers

Print "The setAllowFileAccess() method enables or disables file access within WebView."
```

Figure 4. This is an algorithm looking at the state attributes for plugin, allow file access and Java script.

3.2.4 Do not log sensitive information

This algorithm is based on rule DRD04-J in CERT rules. The log file can be read by other applications with the proper permission before Android version 4.0. Log files can still be read if the device is connected to a computer. To protect against this vulnerability, the algorithm will look for data written to log files. When SACH detects that data is being logged, SACH will generate a warning that the user is writing to a log file and display the line number. The analyst will need to determine if the information logged is sensitive.

Input:

java file

Algorithm:

variable line_number

array lines

parse each line for “Log.d(” x “) or Log.v(” x “) or Log.e(” x “) or Log.i(” x “) or Log.w(” x “) ”

increment line_number

if found store line_number in array lines

if lines is empty

output “Did not find any logs ”

if line_number exist

output “WARNING: potential security vulnerability in line(s):”

foreach lines

output line_number

Output :

Prior to Android 4.0, any application with READ_LOGS permission could obtain all the other applications' log output. After Android 4.1, the specification of READ_LOGS permission has

been changed. Even applications with READ_LOGS permission cannot obtain log output from other applications.

However, by connecting an Android device to a PC, log output from other applications can be obtained.

Therefore, it is important that applications do not send sensitive information to log output in plain text.

Figure 5. This is an algorithm to detect the use of a log file.

SACH also searches if particular sensitive information such as the DeviceId and GPS information is being logged using the output of FlowDroid (*Figure 6*).

Input:

Read in FlowDroid output

Algorithm:

Variable add to queue

store line number in a string

create a queue linked list

read in each line

Evaluate if the line is a detections of a flow and if it is a log sink

if the line is detection of a flow not pertaining to log, set the variable to add to the queue to false

if the line is a flow pertaining to send logs, set the variable to add to the queue to true

Evaluate if the line contains `getDeviceID` as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true

extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variable and store warning message into queue

Evaluate if the line contains `getLatitude` as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true

extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variable

add warning message "The GPS latitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" within the method "?"

Evaluate if the line contains `getLongitude` as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true

extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variable and store warning message into queue

add warning message "The GPS longitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" within the method "?"

The final line contains "Analysis" at the beginning. If the line contains "Analysis" at the beginning, the you have reached the last line

If the queue is empty, then print out that nothing was found

else, if the queue is not empty

write each node in the queue to the report text file

set add to queue variable to false

Output:

Prior to Android 4.0, any application with READ_LOGS permission could obtain all the other applications' log output. After Android 4.1, the specification of READ_LOGS permission has been changed. Even applications with READ_LOGS permission cannot obtain log output from other applications.

However, by connecting an Android device to a PC, log output from other applications can be obtained.

Therefore, it is important that applications do not send sensitive information to log output in plain text.

Figure 6. This is an algorithm to parse FlowDroid output for data leakage to the log file.

3.2.5 Restrict access to activities

This algorithm is based on rule DRD09-J in CERT rules. To prevent unauthorized access to an activity, a developer can restrict access by specifying the export attribute be set to false. This algorithm detects if the export attribute is not set to false, and will generate a warning message.

input:

project.properties

Androidmanifest.xml

algorithm:

variable api

variable automatic_private_api=17

variable regardless_available_api=8;

parse project.properties for api version

store api version in variable api

variable exported_value

array activity_info

variable activity_name

variable public_activity= ““android:exported="true"”

variable private_activity= “android:exported="false" ”

parse file for “<provider” to “/>”

store text into array content_provider_info

```

parse each array in content_provider_info for “android:exported=“false”” and
“android:name=“+*+” “”

if export_value == public_activity

write to text file, “WARNING: Found activity: ”+activity_name+ “set as public. If the activity is
intended solely for the internal use of the app and an intent filter is declared then any other apps,
including malware, can activate the activity for unintended use.”

else if export_value == private_activity && api > regardless_available_api

do nothing

else if export_value==null && api >= variable automatic_private_api

do nothing

else

write to text file, “WARNING: Found activity: ”+activity_name+ “set as public. If the activity
is intended solely for the internal use of the app and an intent filter is declared then any other
apps, including malware, can activate the activity for unintended use.”

```

Figure 7. This is an algorithm to detect if an Android activity is public.

3.2.6 Do not release apps as debuggable

This algorithm is based on the rule DRD10-J in CERT rules. If the application is released as debuggable; this means, an user does not need the source code to debug the application. This algorithm checks to ensure the debuggable attribute is set to false. If the debuggable attribute is not set to false, then a warning message will be generated.

input:

Project.properties

Androidmanifest.xml

algorithm:

variable debuggable_value

variable debuggable_activity= "android:debuggable="true""

variable non_debuggable_activity= "android:debuggable="false""

parse file for android:debuggable= x

store text into variable debuggable

parse each array in content_provider_info for "android:exported="false"" and android:name=x

```
if debuggable_value == non_debuggable_activity  
  
    write to text file, "The debug able attribute is set to false"  
  
else  
  
    write to text file, "WARNING: Found activity: "+activity_name+ "set as public. If the activity  
is intended solely for the internal use of the app and an intent filter is declared than any other  
apps, including malware, can activate the activity for unintended use."
```

Figure 8. This algorithm is designed to detect if the Android application is debuggable.

CHAPTER 4

Prototype implementation of SACH

This chapter will present the implementation of SACH, the methodology of testing and the results of SACH.

4.1 Implementation

SACH is a Java application developed using Netbeans IDE 8.0. SACH is made up of a main class and a class named algorithms where all of the vulnerability checks are implemented. First the apk is loaded into FlowDroid to produce a result text file. The path of the Android manifest file, root directory of source java code and the text output from FlowDroid are input into SACH. 4 algorithms have been implemented.. Each vulnerability method is initiated as an object from the algorithm class allowing the developer to skip any particular vulnerability search.

4.2 Testing and Results

The system used for testing is an i7 processor using Windows7 with 16 gb of RAM. 73 applications have been analyzed from Droidbench developed by EC Spride. The 73 programs were also manually analyzed to validate the result73 application SACH scored a 100 percent score detecting instances where logs was used. SACH was also scored an 80 percent when identifying if the longitude or latitude is written to a log and scored a 50 percent when detecting if the DeviceId was written to a log. None of the 73 applications has the vulnerability of writing the DeviceId or GPS locations to a broadcast intent. Also none of the 73 applications was released as debuggable. *Figure 8* shows an example output of FlowDroid and *Figure 9* shows the results of SACH.

WARNING: Found sensitive information is being logged
--

The deviceID is being logged in the java class

com.javacodegeeks.android.broadcastreceiverstest.MainActivity within the method void
broadcastCustomIntent(android.view.View)

WARNING: potential security vulnerability in A:\Documents\Droidbench\DroidBench-
master\eclipse-

project\BroadcastReceiversTest\src\com\javacodegeeks\android\broadcastreceiverstest\MainActi
vity.java on line(s):

57

Prior to Android 4.0, any application with READ_LOGS permission could obtain all the other
applications' log output. After Android 4.1, the specification of READ_LOGS permission has
been changed. Even applications with READ_LOGS permission cannot obtain log output from
other applications.

However, by connecting an Android device to a PC, log output from other applications can be
obtained.

Therefore, it is important that applications do not send sensitive information to log output

```
Did not find debuggable vulnerability

WARNING: Found sensitive information being sent via Broadcast intent

    The deviceID is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class
com.javacodegeeks.android.broadcastreceiverstest.MainActivity within the method void
broadcastCustomIntent(android.view.View)

*****
*****
```

Figure 9. Example output of SACH




Figure 10. SACH testing results

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion and Future Work

As the new generation of mobile devices continue to grow and connect users to existing online services, it is imperative for mobile application developers to implement secure code to handle user's sensitive data. With Android dominating the market by 81%, this means that many users are using this operating system and the applications built for it. The issue this research attempt to answer is how to help Android developer implement secure code before it is released on the open market for download. Static analysis is a technique to analyze source code without running the application on a device. Designing a statically analysis tool may be able to assist novice mobile application developers or developers who do not have an in depth knowledge of programming secure Android programs.

This research proposes SACH, a tool to identify security vulnerabilities based on CERT Oracle Secure Coding Rules for Android. It utilizes FlowDroid to detect data leakage. A prototype has been implemented which detects whether the application leaks information through implicit broadcast intent and through log files, use of logs by looking at the java source code and if the application is defined as debuggable in the Android manifest file. Seventy three applications have been tested from DroidBench (Artz, 2014) .SACH scored 100 percent in detecting instances where logs was used and scored 80 percent in identifying if the longitude or latitude is written to a log. SACH scored 50 percent in detecting if the DeviceId was written to a log. None of the 73 applications presented the vulnerability of writing the DeviceId or GPS locations to a broadcast intent. Also none of the 73 applications were released as debuggable.

SACH provides a proof of concept of being able to analyze the source code to identify data leakage and access control vulnerabilities.

Future work will seek to implement more algorithms based on CERT Oracle of Secure Coding Rules for Android and identify other data leakages that can result in sensitive data being obtain by a 3rd party. The performance of SACH will be further tested with larger number of Android applications. Also due to the limitation of static analysis in producing false positives and false negative, finding methods to improve the static analysis accuracy will also be our future work.

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ayAccess1								
ArraysAndLists_ArrayAccess2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ArraysAndLists_HashMapAccess1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ArraysAndLists_ListAccess1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_AnonymousClass1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_Button1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_Button2	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_Button3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_Button4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_LocationLeak1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_LocationLeak2	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_LocationLeak3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_MethodOverride1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_MultiHandlers1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_Ordering1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Callbacks_RegisterG	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

lobal1								
Callbacks_RegisterG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
lobal2								
Callbacks_Unregistr1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
FieldAndObjectSensitivity_FieldSensitivity2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FieldAndObjectSensitivity_FieldSensitivity3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FieldAndObjectSensitivity_FieldSensitivity4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FieldAndObjectSensitivity_InheritedObjects1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FieldAndObjectSensitivity_ObjectSensitivity1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FieldAndObjectSensitivity_ObjectSensitivity2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_Exceptions1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

GeneralJava_Excepti ons2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_Excepti ons3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_Excepti ons4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_Loop1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_Loop2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_Source CodeSpecific1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_StaticIn itIALIZATION1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_StaticIn itIALIZATION2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_Unreac hableCode	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_Virtual Dispatch1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ImplicitFlows_Impli citFlow1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ImplicitFlows_Impli citFlow2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ImplicitFlows_Impli citFlow3	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ImplicitFlows_Impli	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

citFlow4								
GeneralJava_Source CodeSpecific1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_StaticIn itIALIZATION1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_StaticIn itIALIZATION2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_Unreac hableCode	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GeneralJava_Virtual Dispatch1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ImplicitFlows_Impli citFlow1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ImplicitFlows_Impli citFlow2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ImplicitFlows_Impli citFlow3	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ImplicitFlows_Impli citFlow4	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
InterAppCommunica tion_ActivityCommu nication1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
InterAppCommunica tion_IntentSink1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
InterAppCommunica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

tion_IntentSink2								
Lifecycle_ActivityLi fecycle1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lifecycle_ActivityLi fecycle2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lifecycle_ActivityLi fecycle3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lifecycle_ActivityLi fecycle4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lifecycle_Applicatio nLifecycle1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lifecycle_Applicatio nLifecycle2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lifecycle_Applicatio nLifecycle3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lifecycle_Broadcast ReceiverLifecycle1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lifecycle_Fragment Lifecycle1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lifecycle_ServiceLif ecycle1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reflection_Reflectio n1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reflection_Reflectio n2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Reflection_Reflectio n3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reflection_Reflectio n4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Found	66	4	4	5	0	0	0	0
Total vulnerabilities	66	5	5	10	0	0	0	0

Appendix B

Source Code for SACH B-1

Main Class of SACH

```
public class SACH {

    /**
     * @param args the command line arguments
     */

    public static void TranverseDirectory(String filePath) { //This method transverses the root
directory of the java source

        Algorithms algorithm = new Algorithms();

        File folder = new File(filePath);

        File[] listOfFiles = folder.listFiles();

        for (File listOfFile : listOfFiles) {

            if (listOfFile.isFile()) {
```



```
//detects if it is a file

algorithm.DetectLogs(listOfFile.getAbsolutePath());

} else if (listOfFile.isDirectory()) {

    // detects a directory

    TranverseDirectory(listOfFile.getAbsolutePath());

}

}

}

}

public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {

    //To run FlowDroid

    //java -cp soot-trunk.jar;soot-infoflow.jar;soot-infoflow-android.jar;slf4j-api-1.7.5.jar;slf4j-
simple-1.7.5.jar;axml-2.0.jar soot.jimple.infoflow.android.TestApps.Test
"C:\Users\Omega\Desktop\FlowDroid\AndroidSpecific_PrivateDataLeak3.apk" C:\adt-bundle-
windows-x86_64-20140702\sdk\platforms

    try {

        FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt");
```

```
PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file

out.close();

} catch (IOException ex) {

    System.out.println("ERROR");

} //catch IOException error

Scanner user_input = new Scanner(System.in);

System.out.println("Enter the name of the application");

String nameOfApp = user_input.next();

String FlowDroidResultPath = "C:\\Users\\Omega\\Desktop\\FlowDroid\\results1.txt";

String xmlPath = "A:\\Documents\\Droidbench\\DroidBench-master\\eclipse-project\\" +
nameOfApp + "\\AndroidManifest.xml";

String rootOfSourceCode = "A:\\Documents\\Droidbench\\DroidBench-master\\eclipse-
project\\" + nameOfApp + "\\src\\";

Algorithms algorithm = new Algorithms();

algorithm.FindFlowsToLogs(FlowDroidResultPath);

TraverseDirectory(rootOfSourceCode);//Detects logs in source code

algorithm.DetectIfAppIsDebuggable(xmlPath);

algorithm.FindFlowsToSendBroadcast(FlowDroidResultPath);
```

```
}
```

```
}
```

Source Code for SACH B-2

Algorithm Class

```
public class Algorithms {  
  
    Boolean addToQueue = false;//boolean variable to determine if information needs to be added  
to queue, initialize it to false so nothing can be added to the queue  
  
    void DetectLogs(String filePath) {  
  
        int counter = 0;  
  
        Queue queue = new LinkedList();// create a queue linked list  
  
        try {  
  
            LineNumberReader lineReader = new LineNumberReader(new  
FileReader(filePath));//read in text file  
  
            String lineText = null;//store line in a string  
  
            while ((lineText = lineReader.readLine()) != null) { // read in each line  
  
                counter++;  
  
            }  
  
        }  
  
    }  
  
}
```

```
        if
(lineText.matches(".*Log.d(.*).*|.*Log.i(.*).*|.*Log.v(.*).*|.*Log.e(.*).*|.*Log.i(.*).*|.*Log.w(.*).*")) { // Evaluate if the line is a detections of a flow and if it is a send broadcast sink

            queue.add(counter);

        }

    }

    if (queue.isEmpty()) {

    } else {

        try {

            FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true);

            PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile); // writing to text file

            out.println("WARNING: potential security vulnerability in " + filePath + " on
line(s):");

            out.close();

        } catch (IOException ex) {

            System.out.println("ERROR");

        } //catch IOException error
```

```
while (queue.size() != 0) {

    //pop the queue

    try {

        FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true);

        PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file

        out.println(queue.remove());

        out.close();

    } catch (IOException ex) {

        System.out.println("ERROR");

    } //catch IOException error

}

try {

    FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true);

    PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file

    out.println("Prior to Android 4.0, any application with READ_LOGS permission
could obtain all the other applications' log output. After Android 4.1, the specification of
```

READ_LOGS permission has been changed. Even applications with READ_LOGS permission cannot obtain log output from other applications.\n"

+ "However, by connecting an Android device to a PC, log output from other applications can be obtained.\n"

+ "Therefore, it is important that applications do not send sensitive information to log

```
output\n\n*****
*****\n*****
*****\n");
```

```
        out.close();

    } catch (IOException ex) {

        System.out.println("ERROR");

    } //catch IOException error

    }

    } catch (IOException ex) {

        System.out.println("ERROR");

    } //catch IOException error
```

```
}

void DetectIfAppIsDebuggable(String filePath) {

    boolean openBraceForApplication = false;

    boolean closeBraceForApplication = false;

    boolean isDebuggable = false;

    try {

        LineNumberReader lineReader = new LineNumberReader(new
FileReader(filePath)); //read in text file

        String lineText = null; //store line in a string

        while ((lineText = lineReader.readLine()) != null) { // read in each line

            if (lineText.matches(".*<application.*")) { // Evaluate if the line is a detections of a
flow and if it is a send broadcast sink

                openBraceForApplication = true;

            }

        }

    }

}
```



```

        if (lineText.matches(".*android:debuggable.*=.*/.*true.*")) { // Evaluate if the line
is a detections of a flow and if it is a send broadcast sink

            isDebuggable = true;

        }

        if (lineText.matches(".*</application>.*")) { // Evaluate if the line is a detections of a
flow and if it is a send broadcast sink

            closeBraceForApplication = true;

            if (openBraceForApplication == true && isDebuggable == true &&
closeBraceForApplication == true) {

                try {

                    FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true);

                    PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile); // writing to text file

                    out.println("WARNING: The application is debuggable attribute in the
AndroidManifest.xml is not set to true. The application could be debugged without the need of
the source code resulting in leakage of
data\n\n*****
*****\n*****
*****\n");

```

```
        out.close();

    } catch (IOException ex) {

        System.out.println("ERROR");

    } //catch IOException error

} else {

    try {

        FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true);

        PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile); // writing to text file

        out.println("Did not find debuggable vulnerability");

        out.close();

    } catch (IOException ex) {

        System.out.println("ERROR");

    } //catch IOException error

}

}
```

```
    }

    } catch (IOException ex) {

        System.out.println("ERROR");

    } //catch IOException error

}

void FindFlowsToSendBroadcast(String filePath) { // method to find flows via send broadcast

    try {

        LineNumberReader lineReader = new LineNumberReader(new
FileReader(filePath)); //read in text file

        String lineText = null; //store line in a string

        Queue queue = new LinkedList(); // create a queue linked list

        while ((lineText = lineReader.readLine()) != null) { // read in each line

            if (lineText.matches("Found a flow.*") != lineText.matches("Found a
flow.*sendBroadcast.*")) { // Evaluate if the line is a detections of a flow and if it is a send
broadcast sink
```

```

        addToQueue = false;// if the line is detection of a flow not pertaining to send
broadcast, set the variable to add to the queue to false

    }

    if (lineText.matches("Found a flow.*sendBroadcast.*")) { // determine if the line is a
detection of a send broadcast flow

        addToQueue = true;// if the line is a send broadcast flow, set the variable to add to
the queue to true

        queue.add("WARNING: Found sensitive information being sent via Broadcast
intent");// add warning message "WARNING: Found sensitive information being sent via
Broadcast intent" to queue

    }

    if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getDeviceId().*"))
{// Evaluate if the line contains DeviceID as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to
true

        Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getDeviceId.*in
<(.*):(.*>.*");//extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variables

        Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText);

        if (matcher.matches()) {

```

```

        queue.add("    The deviceID is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "
+ matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2)); //add warning message "The
deviceID is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" within the method "?"

    }

}

    if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLatitude.*")) { //
Evaluate if the line contains getLatitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true

        Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLatitude.*in <(.*):(.*>.*");
//extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variable

        Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText);

        if (matcher.matches()) {

            queue.add("    The GPS Latitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java
class " + matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2)); //add warning message
"The GPS latitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" within the method "?"

        }

    }

    if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLongitude.*"))
{// Evaluate if the line contains getLongitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to
true

```

```

        Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLongitude.*in
<(.*):(.*)>.*");//extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variable

        Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText);

        if (matcher.matches()) {

            queue.add("    The GPS Longitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java
class " + matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2));//add warning message
"The GPS longitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" within the method
"?"

        }

    }

    if (lineText.matches("Analysis.*")) { //The final line contains "Analysis" at the
beginning. If the line contains "Analysis" at the beginning, then you have reached the last line

        if (queue.isEmpty()) { // If the queue is empty, then print out that nothing was found

            try {

                FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true);

                PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file

                out.println("Did not find flows to sendBroadcast sink");

                out.close();

```

```

    } catch (IOException ex) {

        System.out.println("ERROR");

    } //catch IOException error

    addToQueue = false; // set add to queue variable to false

} else {

    try {

        FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true);

        PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile); // writing to text file

        while (queue.size() != 0) { // else, if the queue is not empty

            out.println(queue.remove()); // write each node in the queue to the report text
file

        }

        out.println("\n");

        out.println("Using sendBroadcast() ,any application on the system can receive the broadcast,
including malicious applications.\n"

+ "Solutions:\n"

+ "Receivers of the broadcast should be restricted. Starting with Android version Icecream
Sandwich you can restrict the broadcast to a single application using Intent.setPackage. It is

```



```

}

void FindFlowsToLogs(String filePath) { // method to find flows via logs

    try {

        LineNumberReader lineReader = new LineNumberReader(new
FileReader(filePath)); // read in FlowDroid output

        String lineText = null; // store line in a string

        Queue queue = new LinkedList(); // create a queue linked list

        while ((lineText = lineReader.readLine()) != null) { // read in each line

            if (lineText.matches("Found a flow.*") != lineText.matches("Found a flow to sink
staticinvoke <android.util.Log.*")) { // Evaluate if the line is a detections of a flow and if it is a
log sink

                addToQueue = false; // if the line is detection of a flow not pertaining to send
broadcast, set the variable to add to the queue to false

            }

            if (lineText.matches("Found a flow to sink staticinvoke <android.util.Log.*")) {

                addToQueue = true; // if the line is detection of a flow pertains to send logs, set the
variable to add to the queue to true

```

```

        queue.add("WARNING: Found sensitive information is being logged");

    }

    if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getDeviceId.*"))
    { // Evaluate if the line contains getDeviceID as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to
    true

        Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getDeviceId.*in
    <(.*):(.*)>.*");//extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variable

        Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText);

        if (matcher.matches()) {

            queue.add("  The deviceID is being logged in the java class " +
    matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2));

        }

    }

    if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLatitude.*")) { //
    Evaluate if the line contains getLatitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true

        Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLatitude.*in
    <(.*):(.*)>.*");//extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variable

        Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText);

```

```

        if (matcher.matches()) {

            queue.add("    The GPS Latitude is being logged in the java class " +
matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2));

        }

    }

    if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLongitude.*"))
{// Evaluate if the line contains getLongitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to
true

        Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLongitude.*in
<(.*):(.*)>.*");//extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variable

        Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText);

        if (matcher.matches()) {

            queue.add("    The GPS Longitude is being logged in the java class " +
matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2));//add warning message "The GPS
longitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" within the method "?"

        }

    }

    if (lineText.matches(".*Analysis.*")) {//The final line contains "Analysis" at the
beginning. If the line contains "Analysis" at the beginning, the you have reached the last line

```

```
if (queue.isEmpty()) { // If the queue is empty, then print out that nothing was found

    try {

        FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true);

        PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile); // writing to text file

        out.println("Did not find flows to log sink");

        out.close();

    } catch (IOException ex) {

        System.out.println("ERROR");

    } //catch IOException error

    addToQueue = false; // set add to queue variable to false

} else {

    try {

        FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true);

        PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile); // writing to text file

        while (queue.size() != 0) { // else, if the queue is not empty

            out.println(queue.remove()); // write each node in the queue to the report text
file

        }

    }

}
```

```
        out.close();

    } catch (IOException ex) {

        System.out.println("ERROR");

    } //catch IOException error

    addToQueue = false; // set add to queue variable to false

    }

}

}

} catch (IOException ex) { // the exception if error

    System.err.println(ex);

}

}
```



}